DMart vs Swiggy vs Eternal: Who’s Really Winning the Retailing Market?

The retail battle on discounts is beginning to converge, but the war continues

The battle for India’s grocery wallet is taking an unexpected turn. While quick commerce giants Zomato and Swiggy dominate headlines with their 10-minute delivery promises and billion-dollar cash burn, the real story emerging tells a tale—one where DMart’s boring brick-and-mortar strategy might actually survive the digital onslaught.

Avenue Supermarts (DMart) trades at Rs 3,866 as of February 23, down 22% from its 52-week high of Rs 4,950 but still commanding a Rs 2.51 lakh crore market capitalization at a steep 87x price-to-earnings multiple. Zomato (Eternal Ltd) fluctuates around Rs 287-306 after crashing 28% from its October 2025 peak, while Swiggy has plummeted 42% from record highs to Rs 328-359 levels.

But stock performance alone doesn’t tell the complete story of who’s winning this retail war.

The Pricing Convergence 

Karan Taurani, senior analyst covering internet and media at Elara Capital, conducted detailed pricing checks across quick commerce platforms and DMart stores that reveal a surprising development: the brutal discount war that defined 2024 and early 2025 is finally cooling down.

His ground-level research across 16 product categories—from Amul milk to Parle-G biscuits to Fortune sunflower oil—shows that pricing differentials are converging rapidly. DMart Offline offers approximately 8% discount to Blinkit’s prices and roughly 14% discount to maximum retail price. Zepto and Instamart are 3-4% cheaper than Blinkit, offering around 10% discount on MRP, placing all three quick commerce players in pricing proximity.

Translation: DMart’s price advantage over quick commerce has shrunk dramatically from the 15-20% gaps seen a year ago to single digits today.

“We believe peak discounting is largely behind us, as Swiggy refocuses on profitability and IPO-bound Zepto rationalizes its promotional intensity,” Taurani noted in his February 23 report. “Blinkit, already EBITDA profitable, has largely avoided the price war.”

The detailed pricing comparison from a DMart store in Vidyavihar, Mumbai, tells the story. A basket of 16 common household items cost Rs 1,680 at DMart, Rs 1,771 at Instamart, Rs 1,756 at Zepto, and Rs 1,825 at Blinkit—just 5-9% variation across the board.

Quick Commerce Can’t Keep Burning Cash

The shift toward pricing rationality is survival. Quick commerce players have compressed their margins to unsustainable levels chasing growth. The data from Taurani’s research shows DMart’s gross margins fell from 14.6% in Q1FY24 to 14.6% in Q3FY26 (fluctuating between 13.5-14.9% throughout), while EBITDA margins compressed from 8.9% to 8.4% as the company defended its “Everyday Lower Price” positioning.

But Blinkit’s journey is dramatic. The platform’s adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of gross merchandise value crashed from negative 6.2% in Q1FY24 to negative 1.9% in Q4FY25, before turning marginally positive at 0.0% in Q3FY26. That is a 620-basis point improvement, but it came at enormous cost—Blinkit’s parent Zomato invested billions in dark store expansion while accepting contribution margins of just 3%.

“Cooling competitive intensity augurs well for DMart,” Taurani stated. “The peak of price-led discounting is largely behind, particularly as Swiggy pivots toward quality-led growth over aggressive customer acquisition. Any pricing differential convergence may lead DMart to pare its own discounting intensity, which could arrest the slide in margins by a few basis points.”

Swiggy’s Q3 conference call confirmed this and acknowledging that measured store expansion and contribution margin discipline would take precedence over pure growth metrics. IPO-bound Zepto faces similar pressures to demonstrate a path to profitability before going public.

Here’s where the story gets complex. Despite narrowing price gaps, quick commerce continues growing at triple-digit rates in urban India. Why? Because top-up purchases—the evening run for milk, the forgotten party supplies, the 11 PM ice cream craving—have permanently shifted to 10-minute delivery.

DMart’s like-for-like growth has slowed to the 5-6% band, down from historical 7-8% levels, precisely because quick commerce has captured this high-frequency, low-basket-size segment. The company now operates 449 stores across India after adding locations in Gachibowli (Telangana), Mandore (Rajasthan), and Pakhowal (Punjab) through February 2026.

“For DMart, despite lower prices, convenience proposition shall continue to drive quick commerce growth as top-up purchases continue to shift from modern trade,” Taurani explained. “Hence catalyzing LFL growth to 7-8% band (from the present 5-6%) would require: a) healthy pick-up in metro stores and b) new store mix from quick commerce unsensitive pockets (non-metro).”

The implication is clear: DMart’s growth revival depends on expanding into Tier-II and Tier-III cities where quick commerce hasn’t penetrated, not winning back urban customers who’ve discovered the convenience of 10-minute grocery delivery.

The Profitability Focus 

“Increased focus on profitability by quick commerce players will help pare losses,” he noted, identifying three key developments: “a) Blinkit stands out, having sidestepped the price war, maintaining its edge and profitability discipline. b) Instamart’s measured store expansion (contribution margin guidance retained by Q1FY27) emphasizes on aggressive pivot. c) IPO-bound Zepto may rationalize its discounting strategy in the near term to demonstrate a path to profitability.”

If quick commerce platforms stop competing on price and start competing on service quality, assortment breadth, and delivery speed, DMart’s pricing advantage becomes less important. The company can maintain its 13-14% discounts to MRP, deliver 8-9% EBITDA margins, and serve the large segment of price-conscious Indian consumers willing to visit stores for weekly/monthly shopping trips.

India’s organized retail market is projected to reach Rs 30 lakh crore, with grocery accounting for 60-65% of that opportunity. Quick commerce currently captures perhaps 2-3% of total grocery spending in metros but is growing at 100%+ annually. DMart has 3-4% national market share but much higher shares in its core markets.

Quick commerce will likely own emergency/convenience purchases and top-ups in urban India. DMart will continue dominating planned weekly shopping for middle-class families. But the stock market is pricing these outcomes very differently.

DMart trades at 68x FY27E and 58x FY28E P/E multiples according to Taurani’s analysis—a steep premium reflecting investor belief that predictable, profitable growth beats exciting but money-losing expansion. Zomato and Swiggy trade at fractions of revenue despite triple-digit growth rates, reflecting uncertainty about whether unit economics ever sustainably work at 3% contribution margins.

Taurani remains Not Rated on DMart, and maintains Buy ratings on both Zomato (target Rs 415) and Swiggy (target Rs 425), with preference for Zomato given its leadership position in quick commerce through Blinkit